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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two reasons for allowing preliminary inquiries of jurors.
First, trial counsel may discover the partiality or interest of the jurors,
and thereby gain grounds for challenge for cause; secondly, facts may
be revealed which will enable counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges. However, it is commonly known that one of the most important
"fringe benefits" of voir dire is that it offers an opportunity for plaintiff
to call to the jury's attention the existence of liability insurance and that
any loss will fall on the insurance company.
No other aspect of voir dire examination has resulted in as inany
appeals as has the plaintiff's questioning about possible relationships
between the jurors and defendant's insurance company.1 The reason is
clear. As the courts have pointed out: "It seems to be the impression of
the bar that the fact that the liability of a defendant in a tort action
is covered by insurance will, in the minds of the average juror, not only
justify a verdict for plaintiff but a very generous assessment of damages
as well. The verdicts in many cases warrant that view." 2
This "impression of the bar" is shared equally by the bench. The
courts have frankly acknowledged that the mere asking of such questions
is equivalent to giving direct information to the jurors that an insurance
company is obligated to pay any judgment rendered. 3 And, as such infor-
mation is "so irrelevant and prejudicial" 4 as to warrant discharging the
jury, the courts have condemned voir dire tactics which have such an
effect as their deliberate purpose and result as tending to "poison the
minds of the jurors."' '
II. THE STARTING POINT
We must begin with the basic proposition that a litigant is entitled
to a fair and impartial jury. "Under our system of jurisprudence there is
no feature of a trial more important and more necessary to the pure and
just administration of the law than that every litigant shall be accorded
a fair trial before a jury of his countrymen, who enter upon the trial
1. See Annot. 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
2. Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876, 51 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Henry v. Tinsley, 240
Mo. App. 163, 218 S.W.2d 771 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949).
3. Burrows v. Likes, 180 Mo. App. 447, 166 S.W. 643 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
4. Id. at 456, 166 S.W. at 646.
5. Chambers v. Kennedy, 274 S.W. 726, 729 (Mo. 1925).
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LIABILITY INSURANCE
totally disinterested and wholly unprejudiced."' If the defendant's insurer
will bear the ultimate loss then any connection between a juror and that
company may serve to cast a shadow on that total disinterest or whole
unprejudice. As Judge Stone of the Springfield Court of Appeals has aptly
phrased it "[W]e remain mindful of the eternal verity that, whatever else
may change in this changing world, the impelling self interest, motivating
emotions and besetting frailties of members of the human family abide
unchanged."7
Thus, in Murphy v. Cole," when it was revealed on voir dire that a
juror was the local agent for defendant's insurance company, counsel for
plaintiff challenged for cause. The juror said he had not written the
policy involved; that he had never heard of the case before; that he did
not know the plaintiff and had no prejudice in the case. The challenge
was overruled and plaintiff excepted. The Supreme Court reversed the
case on that point stating: "If for any reason, whether statutory or not,
a prospective juror is not in a position to enter the jury box with an
open mind, free from bias or prejudice against either party to the cause,
and decide the case upon the evidence adduced and the law as contained
in the court's instructions, he is not a competent juror." 9
Since counsel for plaintiff has a legitimate interest in inquiring as to
the possible relationships between the jurors and defendant's insurer,
to deny counsel such inquiry has been held to be reversible error.10
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Laying emphasis on the fundamental right to an impartial jury,
the courts have tolerated voir dire on the subject of insurance even where
the inquiry seems to have been designed to accomplish the very results
which have been so strongly deplored. An examination of judicial opinions
from a historical standpoint may provide a better understanding of the
present law on the subject.
6. Theobald v. St. Louis Transit Co., 191 Mo. 395, 416-17, 90 S.W. 354, 359
(1905).
7. Ozark Border Elec. Coop. v. Stacy, 348 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Spr. Mo. App.
1961).
8. 338 Mo. 13, 88 S.W.2d 1023 (1935).
9. Id. at 19, 88 S.W.2d at 1024.
10. Jenkins v. Chase, 53 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1932); Decker v. Liberty, 39 S.W.2d
546 (Mo. 1931); Galber v. Grossberg, 324 Mo. 742, 25 S.W.2d 96 (1930); Smith v
Star Cab Co., 323 Mo. 441, 19 S.W.2d 467 (1929).
1964]
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A. Laying tke Foundation
Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co." is the earliest leading case where the
problem under discussion arose. In Boten plaintiff knew that an insurance
company was interested in the outcome of the case but did not know
the specific name of the company, apparently because defendant's counsel
had not so informed him. On voir dire plaintiff asked the jurors about
their relations with any liability insurance company. Defendant objected
and moved to discharge the jury. Out of the hearing of the jury defendant
admitted that an insurance company was defending the case "to a certain
extent" but he argued that questions on voir dire were proper only when
made with reference to a specific company. Under questioning from the
court plaintiff said that defendant's counsel, in telling him of the insurance
company did not tell him the company's name.1 2 The court thereupon
overruled the objection. On appeal it was held that the question was
not erroneous if the inquiry was made in good faith and was not "conducted
beyond reasonable limits." The court concluded that in this case it could
not be said that the question was asked in bad faith. It is significant to
note the court's comment that the question asked "did not tell [the jury]
anything more than they would have known as intelligent men, i.e., that
in all probability defendant carried liability insurance."13
It appears from the Boten case that plaintiff's counsel had, prior
to voir dire examination, asked defendant if he was insured. This was
the established and approved way of laying the foundation for voir dire
questions relating to insurance. Such inquiry was considered to be evidence
that plaintiff's questions were intended to be consistent with the legitimate
ends of voir dire.
In Hill v. Jackson," plaintiff, without prior inquiry, asked the jurors:
"Are any of you gentlemen employed by the Medical Protective Associa-
tion? Are any of you stockholders in that insurance company?" 15 Defendant
objected to both questions and the court overruled both objections. On
appeal the court did not pass on the prejudicial nature of these two
11. 180 Mo. App. 96, 166 S.W. 883 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
12. In light of defendant's argument it would appear that he had refused to
divulge the name although it is possible that he merely neglected to do so or even
that plaintiff had not so specifically inquired.
13. Supra note 11, at 109, 166 S.W. at 888.
14. 272 S.W. 105 (K.C. Mo. App. 1925).
15. Id. at 107.
[Vol. 29
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questions"' but did point out that plaintiff had made no inquiry to find
out whether defendant was insured by the company named, and further
that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the company was
involved. The court observed that the "proper" procedure would be for
plaintiff to inquire, out of the jury's presence and before voir dire, whether
any insurance company is connected with the case. "It is then the duty
of defendant's counsel to state the true facts to the court and if it appears
that there is a liability insurance company in the case, its name should
be stated, and the interrogation of the jurors as to their relation with
the company would be proper."17
In Chambers v. Kennedy,18 the first Supreme Court decision in this
area, the requirement of a proper foundation was strongly noted. In
Chambers, plaintiff, without conducting any preliminary inquiry, asked
one of the jurors "if he was interested in any manner, as a stockholder
or otherwise, in the Continental Casualty Company or any other insurance
company engaged in issuing policies of insurance to indemnify persons
against claims for damages on account of personal injuries."'" Defendant
objected and moved to discharge the jury. The objection was overruled
and defendant excepted. On appeal the court reversed and remanded,
strongly condemning as "highly prejudicial" voir dire on the subject of
insurance in the absence of good faith. They observed that in view of
the remoteness of drawing a juror actually connected with an insurance
company interested in the defense that counsel should have shown their
good faith prior to asking such questions.20
Six months later however, the Kansas City Court of Appeals ap-
proved a nearly identical question in Balderson v. Monaghan.21 The
court specifically distinguished Chambers by pointing out that prior
to the voir dire the defendant had admitted that he was insured with
the company about which the inquiry was made and that plaintiff's good
faith had been established.
B. Good Faith
The use of prior inquiry to establish a foundation for voir dire was
not a procedural requirement, but was regarded as evidence of the ques-
16. There was ample evidence of prejudice in plaintiff's cross-examinations dur-
ing which the subject of liability insurance also arose.
17. Supra note 14 at 107.
18. Supra note 5.
19. Id. at 727.
20. Id. at 729.
21. 278 S.W. 783 (K.C. Mo. App. 1926).
1964]
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tioner's good faith. And as good faith was the element stressed by the
courts, it is not surprising that soon circumstances other than prior inquiry
were considered to be equally satisfactory evidence of good faith.
In Planett v. McFal122 counsel for plaintiff, without any prior inquiry
to establish a proper foundation, asked "whether any member of the
panel did business with the Maryland Casualty Company or was acquainted
with any of its officers or agents." 23 Defendant objected and moved to
discharge the jury. Out of hearing of the jury, defendant's attorney stated
that the named company had insured defendant, but that the company
had denied all liability and had withdrawn from the case because of alleged
lack of cooperation from the defendant. The trial judge suggested that
the defendant be sworn and examined on this point but his counsel refused.
Thereupon defendant's objection was overruled and he excepted. On ap-
peal the court indicated that the better practice would be for plaintiff's
counsel, through prior questioning, to lay a foundation for his voir dire
but "the real test as to the propriety of such examination is whether the
inquiry is made in good faith."'2- The court found the good faith of plain-
tiff's counsel in his subsequent discussion with the court especially in view
of defense counsel's refusal to permit testimony regarding possible insurance
coverage.
The Supreme Court ruled on the "laying a foundation" requirement
in the leading case of Mamrizi v. Western Coal & Mining Co. 25 Plaintiff,
without first asking defendant about his insurance, asked the jurors as to
their connection with "United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company or
Thomas McGee & Sons, agents of that company in Kansas City.126 De-
fendant objected and moved to discharge the jury. Then, out of the hear-
ing of the jury, defendant's counsel was asked if he represented that
company and if it was interested in the case. He admitted that he was
an attorney for the company but did not answer whether or not he
was representing the company in this case, or whether or not the com-
pany was interested. His objection was overruled. On appeal he contended
that no foundation had been laid for the question, either outside of the
presence of the jury or at any other time.
The court noted that defendant had not claimed at trial that the
22. 284 S.W. 850 (St. L. Mo. App. 1926).
23. Id. at 853.
24. Id. at 854.
25. 321 Mo. 378, 11 S.W.2d 268 (En Banc 1928).
26. Id. at 396, 11 S.W.2d at 274.
[Vol. 29
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insurance company was not interested in the case nor did he so claim on
appeal. The court then said:
We know of no rule requiring a foundation for the examination
of members of the panel as to their qualifications to serve as jurors.
The foundation is the right of a litigant to know the relation of
the members of the panel to the parties and those interested in
the result of the case. Counsel for plaintiff is not required to
prove that an insurance company, or insurance agency, is inter-
ested before inquiring of the members if they are connected with
either. He is presumed to be acting in good faith when he makes
the inquiries. If it appears from the record that counsel had rea-
sonable cause to believe an insurance company, or an insurance
agency was interested, and that he acted in good faith in making
the inquiries, the sound discretion of the court in controlling and
directing the examination will be sustained. On the other hand,
if it should appear from the record that counsel has abused the
privilege, and the inquiries were not for the purpose of being
able to intelligently make peremptory challenges, the action of
the court in permitting the inquiries would not be sustained. The
court should require counsel for plaintiff to inquire of defend-
ant's counsel, out of the hearing of the jury, whether or not the
insurance company is interested in the case, and, if so, the name
of the company. However, it does not follow that a failure to do
so would result in convicting the court of error.2 7
The court observed that if the insurance company was interested then
the defendant could not claim prejudice merely because plaintiff did not
make a prior inquiry, and in view of defendant's evasion of the ques-
tions put to him, it could be assumed that the insurance company was
interested and that plaintiff's inquiry was legitimate.28
Chambers v. Kennedy was distinguished by observing that the rec-
ord in that case did not disclose that the specific insurance company
inquired about, or any other insurance company, was interested in the
defense and that there was no indication that plaintiff had any reasonable
cause to so believe. However subsequent decisions have considered the
Maurizi decision as overruling Chambers.29
27. Id. at 396-397, 11 S.W.2d at 274. Accord, Dooley v. Dooley, 290 S.W.2d
856 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956). For a case where the court intervened to obtain the
name of the defendant's insurer see Payne v. Stott, 181 S.W.2d 161 (K.C. Mo. App.
1944).
28. Supporting the court's holding was the fact that a juror did acknowledge
that he was acquainted with the insurer's agents; that he carried liability insurance
with them, and that he might be prejudiced if they were interested in the case.
29. Smith v. Star Cab Co., supra note 10.
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C. Tke Maurizi Test
1. Reasonable Cause for Belief that an Insurance Company
is Interested in the Case
When plaintiff's counsel conducts his voir dire on insurance without
any prior foundation the court in Maurizi said, "He is presumed to be
acting in good faith when he makes the inquiries.'"30 Will this presump-
tion, standing alone, be sufficient evidence of counsel's reasonable belief
of an insurer's interest?
The question was considered by the Springfield Court of Appeals in
Henry v. TinsleyA1 In that case counsel for plaintiff, without any prior
foundation, inquired of the panel: "Do any of you gentlemen hold in-
surance with the Car and General Insurance Company of New York?" 3 2
Defendant objected and asked that the jury be discharged. The court
overruled the objection but after a verdict for plaintiff, defendant's motion
for a new trial was sustained on the basis that error was committed in
not discharging the jury after the voir dire question of plaintiff's counsel.33
On appeal it was noted that the record gave no indication that plaintiff's
counsel ever undertook to find out if the insurance company was interested
in the case nor was there anything that indicated reasonable grounds
for asking the question. The appellate court found that the trial judge was
justified in the exercise of his discretion to award a new trial. "We find
that as far as the record in this case was concerned there was not the
slightest excuse or justification for plaintiff's counsel to inquire of the
jury on voir dire examination about an insurance company."'
The dissenting opinion in Henry would sustain a presumption of
good faith. After noting that the trial judge had concluded that he had
committed error in refusing to discharge the jury, the dissent quoted
Maurizi, pointing out that in circumstances such as the Henry case,
"the court should require counsel for plaintiff to inquire of defendant's
counsel . . .whether or not the insurance company is interested in the
case .... However, it does not follow that a failure to do so would result
in convicting the court of error."3'
If Henry is strictly followed plaintiff might find himself in an awk-
30. Supra note 25, at 396, 11 S.W.2d at 274.
31. 240 Mo. App. 163, 218 S.W.2d 771 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949).
32. Id. at 166, 218 S.W.2d at 773.
33. The trial judge's decision was also based upon the injection of insurance
during plaintiff's examination of a witness.
34. Supra note 31, at 175, 218 S.W.2d at 779.
35. Supra note 31, at 179-180, 218 S.W.2d at 782 (Opinion of Blair, J.).
[Vol. 29
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ward situation. If he has not laid any foundation and if the court simply
overrules defendant's objection to the voir dire examination then plain-
tiff should make some sort of record about his knowledge of the insurer's
interest. If he does not then the record will lack "the slightest excuse or
justification for the inquiry."
2. Good Faith in Making the Inquiries
If the first part of the test is adequately met, that is, assuming plain-
tiff has proved reasonable cause for belief that an insurance company is
interested, will this constitute sufficient evidence of the propriety of his
motives or at least raise a presumption of propriety so as to satisfy this
second part of the test and allow counsel to conduct his inquiry regardless
of his actual motive?
This question was first considered by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals in Wendel v. City Ice Co.3 Plaintiff had, prior to the voir dire,
determined that a specific company had insured defendant. On voir dire
plaintiff inquired as to the jurors' relationship with the company and its
attorney in fact. On appeal defendant contended that plaintiff had acted
in bad faith. On the question of what constitutes good faith or bad faith
the court said:
If the record affirmatively shows that there was no excuse for
injecting the name of the insurance company into the case, bad
faith will be presumed. If the record shows that the insurance
company is interested in the result, good faith is presumed. If
it shows that there was good reason to believe that an insurance
company was interested in the result, again good faith will be
presumed. In any event, good or bad faith depends upon the ques-
tion as to whether or not the questions on the voir dire concerning
the insurance company were legitimate subjects of inquiry. It has
nothing to do with the motive of an attorney who asks such ques-
tions in a proper case.37
Under such a standard if an insurance company is actually interested
in the result, then plaintiff may inquire about what connections pros-
pective jurors have with that company. And if there is reasonable cause
to believe that an insurance company is interested but plaintiff has
been unable to obtain the specific name, then he may ask prospective
jurors if they are connected with any insurance company. And "it is not
36. 224 Mo. App. 152, 22 S.W.2d 215 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929).
37. Id. at 159, 22 S.W.2d at 219.
1964]
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necessary for the plaintiff to prove his motive or lack of motive for asking
the questions.'3, As the court indicated:
To hold otherwise would mean that if two attorneys represented
a plaintiff in a case where the defendant was injured, and one
attorney harbored a fear that a biased juror might get upon the
panel, but had no thought of what the effect would be upon dis-
interested jurors if they learned of the interest of the insurance
company, but the other attorney did not entertain any serious
apprehension that a biased juror would be chosen, but was anxious
that all the jurors know the interest of the insurance company
in the case, then the question as to whether or not error was
committed by asking the jurors whether or not they had any con-
nection with the insurance company would depend upon which
attorney asked the question.39
But in Carter v. Rock Island Bus Lines ° the Supreme Court said
it would not adopt a rule which would base good faith solely on the
existence of a reasonable belief that defendant was insured. The sole
ground for appeal concerned the propriety of the voir dire. Plaintiff, out
of the hearing of the jury, said he had been informed that American
Fidelity & Casualty Company was defending the cause and he asked
defendant if that was true. Defendant denied that it was. Plaintiff then
said that the Public Service Commission had informed him that the de-
fendant had a policy of that company on file in its offices. Defendant
stated that the policy in question did not cover the vehicle involved in
the accident. Plaintiff then offered to introduce a letter purporting to be
from the Secretary of the Public Service Commission which included the
number of the policy of the insurance company mentioned and the state-
ment that "the policy on file here covers any accident occurring while
the insured is operating pursuant to the certificate of convenience and
necessity issued to him by this Commission . . . [and the operator] is
not permitted to operate unless an insurance policy is filed, insuring that
payment of any judgment against him will be made by the insurance
company." '" Defendant objected, claiming among other things, that the
Public Service Commission could not by letter determine who was in-
terested or liable; that the letter was not the best evidence of coverage;
and that it was hearsay. The court sustained the objection. Two of plain-
38. Id. at 158, 22 S.W.2d at 218.
39. Id. at 159-160, 22 S.W.2d at 219.
40. 345 Mo. 1170, 139 S.W.2d 458 (1940).
41. Id. at 1173, 139 S.W.2d at 460.
[Vol. 29
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss3/2
LIABILITY INSURANCE
tiff's counsel were then sworn and testified as to conversations regarding
settlement of the suit with one Monroe who said that he was with the
American Fidelity & Casualty Company. Defense counsel reiterated that
there was no insurance company interested in the outcome of the case
and no coverage on the vehicle and that there was no showing that the
person who talked with plaintiff's attorneys really represented the insur-
ance company.
The court denied plaintiff's request to examine the panel on this
point and he excepted. On appeal the holding was affirmed. The court
held that in matters such as this, where the trial court has the oppor-
tunity "to see and hear and know counsel,"' ' 2 that much must be left to
the sound discretion of the trial court who "is in closer touch with the
proceedings than we can be from the cold printed record.143 It observed
that ". . . even if the court believed that the plaintiff's counsel was act-
ing in the honest belief that he had the right to interrogate the jury
panel . . . does that conclude the court and make it mandatory that it
allow the interrogation? We think not." The court concluded by hold-
ing that "where full hearing has been accorded, even though the plain-
tiff's evidence may indicate good faith on his part, yet if the trial court
is convinced, on all the evidence heard and the facts and circumstances
shown that in the interests of justice the proposed interrogation should
not be allowed its ruling should not be interfered with by an appellate
court unless there appears from the record a palpable abuse of discretion.""4
The decision in Carter indicates that the good faith required of
counsel is more than that which would be presumed to exist from a rea-
sonable belief of an insurance company's interest which Wendel held to
be sufficient. The court acknowledged that counsel's good faith was indi-
cated by such belief but clearly held that this alone was insufficient. The
decision in Wendel was not referred to nor was the problem raised in it
discussed. However, the court's references to the trial judge's ability "to
see and hear and know counsel" indicates that the propriety of any ques-
tion concerning insurance might depend not only "upon which attorney
asked the question" but also on the manner in which the question was asked.
With such a subjective test and with the wide latitude that the
Carter decision gives to the discretion of the trial court, any attempt
42. Id. at 1177, 139 S.W.2d at 462.
43. Id. at 1176, 139 S.W.2d at 462.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 1177, 139 S.W.2d at 462.
1964]
11
Vetter: Vetter: Voir Dire II--Liability Insurance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to compile examples of bad faith motives from the "cold printed record"
would be of questionable value.
IV. AiTEMPTS OF DEFENDANT TO PREVENT INQUIRY
A. Defendant's Failure to Disclose
Coincident with the expanding freedom given plaintiff in conduct-
ing his voir dire has been a consistent frustrating of attempts by defend-
ants to prevent insurance inquiries. The refusal of defendant to answer
plaintiff's questions about insurance will result in the assumption that
an insurance company is interested;46 an evasion of the question47 or dis-
claimer of knowledge4 will produce the same result.
B. Coverage in Question
Plaintiff's right to inquire about insurance is not defeated by defend-
ant's questionable coverage. In Kaley v. Huntley4' counsel stated that
defendant's policy was effective only in the Chicago area. Defendant
moved to Kansas City without notifying the company thus raising a
question of coverage in the latter city. Counsel did admit, however, that
he had been employed by another lawyer who he assumed was acting
for the company and who indicated that the defense was being made
under the policy. It was held that plaintiff had a right to question the
jurors about the company.
But in Bennett v. Cauble ° counsel for defendants admitted that there
was a policy with a specific company but said that the company had
given notice that it was not liable and would take no part in the defense
and that he was representing the defendants personally. He admitted
that if judgment was against defendants he expected to recover from
the insurance company. Plaintiff was permitted to question the jurors
as to their relationships with the company and defendant excepted. The
appellate court held that inasmuch as the insurance company was not
conducting the defense of the case that it was "highly prejudicial and im-
proper to propound to the jury questions which tended to show that
46. Glick v. Arink, 58 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1932); Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co.,
322 Mo. 765, 18 S.W.2d 42 (1929); Smith v. Scudiero, 204 S.W. 565 (K.C. Mo. App.
1918).
47. Melican v. Whitlow Const. Co., 278 S.W. 361 (Mo. 1925); Gerran v.
Minor, 192 S.W.2d 57 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946); Maurizi v. Western Coal Co., .supra
note 25.
48. Galber v. Grossberg, supra note 10.
49. 88 S.W.2d 200 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935).
50. 167 S.W.2d 959 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
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the insurance company was in fact conducting the defense or was a party
to the pending suit."5' The plaintiff's questions were held to not be legit-
imate subjects of voir dire inquiry and the trial court erred in permitting
them to be asked.
The Supreme Court was confronted with a similar situation in Murphy
v. Graves.52 Counsel for defendants admitted the existence of a liability
insurance policy but denied that the company was interested in the case.
He said that the company had denied liability and that he was representing
the defendants personally. Nevertheless, the trial judge allowed plaintiff
to ask the jurors about their connections with the company. On appeal
the court reversed on other grounds and did not rule on the propriety of
the plaintiff's voir dire. However, in commenting on the voir dire, the
court cited Bennett, and observed that inasmuch as defendant had cate-
gorically denied any coverage that the plaintiff had the affirmative of
showing the existence of coverage and that they were "inclined to the
view plaintiff should have adduced evidence on the issue .. ."3
However, if the company, while denying liability for the amount of
the judgment, does participate in the case to the extent of paying the
costs of the defendant then the plaintiff has the right to question the
jurors in regard to the company.54
C. Jarors' Alleged Disinterest
Defendants, while admitting the interest of the insurance company,
have on occasion attempted to show that no one on the panel was
connected in any way with the insurer and that there was no need, in
good faith, for plaintiff's counsel to make his own inquiry.
In Smitk v. Star Cab Co.,55 defendant argued, in support of the trial
judge's refusal to allow plaintiff to conduct inquiry on this topic, that the
trial judge might have become so acquainted with the character of the
jurors that he knew that none of the jurors had any possible connection
with any insurance company. The court, in reversing, disposed of this
contention by pointing out that even if the trial judge had such knowledge
it would be "no excuse for a denial of plaintiff's right to search the con-
sciences of the members of the panel as to their qualifications to serve
as jurors in the case."5' 6
51. Id. at 961.
52. 294 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1956).
53. Id. at 33.
54. Jedlicka v. Shackelford, 270 S.W. 125 (St. L. Mo. App. 1925).
55. Supra note 10.
56. Supra note 10, at 446, 19 S.W.2d at 469.
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In Tucker v. Kollia 7 a statement by counsel for defendant that
"[No members of this panel or their families are in any way connected
or interested in the Southern Surety Company"' S did not serve to bar
plaintiff's inquiry. It was noted that the statement was not made under
oath nor was any showing made as to the basis for the statement. And
while this language might seem to indicate that a statement fulfilling
those requirements might preclude the plaintiff's voir dire, later decisions
indicate that even this would not be sufficient.
In Smith, v. Lammnertr9 defendant tendered a list of all "merbers" of
the insurance company who were eligible for jury duty in the county
where the trial was held. Plaintiff refused to accept this list. Defendant
objected to plaintiff's proposed voir dire. The objection was sustained
and plaintiff excepted. On appeal the ruling was held to be erroneous and
that the law was settled that plaintiff was entitled to have the jurors'
answer under oath as to their qualifications.
In Dilinden v. Weeks6° defendant offered an affidavit from the in-
surance company that only two members of the panel carried policies
with the company or were in any way connected with the company. The
court refused to accept the affidavit.
That such efforts of defendant will be fruitless is conclusively shown
in Fawkes v. National Refining Co.6' Defendant introduced an affidavit
of a special deputy commissioner for the State of Michigan stating that
he was the custodian and manager of the insurance company concerned
by virtue of a court order of that state; that he had examined the records
of that company and that there was no record of any stockholder being
a resident of Jackson County02 and that the company maintained no
office and had no employees in that county. A defense attorney stated
under oath that the company had concluded all of its business in the
area; that this was the only claim pending on any policy; and that all
other litigation had been settled and concluded. The trial court however
permitted plaintiff to question the jurors regarding their relationships
with the insurance company and the defendant excepted. On appeal the
court noted that there was little likelihood of any member of the panel
being connected in any manner with the insurance company but that on
57. 16 S.W.2d 649 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
58. Id. at 651.
59. 41 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1931).
60. 50 S.W.2d 152 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
61. 235 Mo. App. 433, 130 S.W.2d 684 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939).
62. Trial was in the Circuit Court of Jackson County.
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the other hand there was no evidence of insolvency and the employment
of counsel to defend the case indicated that the company was a live
concern. The plaintiff was entitled to have the members of the jury panel
answer under oath as to their specifications. 6 3
V. THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE INQUIRY
A. The Particuar In sarance Company
The range of possible connections between the jurors and an insur-
ance company is an extensive one. Thus counsel have propounded, and
the courts approved, questions as to whether a juror is an officer,"4 em-
ployee, 6, agent, 6   policyholder,67 stockholder, 8 or claims agent of the
company.66 Courts have also approved questions designed to elicit whether
jurors have any financial interest in the company,70 or have done business
with the company 7' or are in any way connected with72 the company.
Jurors have been properly asked if any members of their family or
relatives are employees,73 stockholders,-4 have a financial interest,75 or
63. In accord as to "out-of-state" or "non-local" companies see Davis v. Quer-
mann, 22 S.W.2d 58 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
64. Glasco Electric Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 332 Mo. 1097, 61
S.W.2d 955 (1933); Wack v. F. E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 197, 53 S.W.2d 28
(1932).
65. Haley v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1955); McCaffery v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 545, 252 S.W.2d 361 (En Banc 1952); Glasco Electric
Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., supra note 64; Dooley v. Dooley, supra
note 27; Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 248 S.W.2d 25 (St. L. Mo. App.
1952); Gerran v. Minor, supra note 47; Hatton v. Sidman, 169 S.W.2d 91 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1943); Faust v. East Prairie Milling Co., 20 S.W.2d 918 (Spr. Mo. App.
1929).
66. Wack v. F. E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co., supra note 64; Johnston v. Owings,
254 S.W.2d 993 (K.C. Mo. App. 1952).
67. Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., supra note 46; Wendel v. City Ice Co., supra
note 36; Duncan v. City Ice Co., 25 S.W.2d 536 (K.C. Mo. App. 1929); Gerran v.
Minor, supra note 47; Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 65; Johnston
v. Owings, supra note 66.
68. Craven v. Halpin-Boyle Const. Co., 15 S.W.2d 853 (K.C. Mo. App. 1929);
Faust v. East Prairie Milling Co., supra note 65; Wendel v. City Ice Co., supra
note 36; Duncan v. City Ice Co., supra note 67; Haley v. Edwards, supra note 65;
Bullock v. Sklar, 349 S.W.2d 381 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
69. Wack v. F. E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co., supra note 64.
70. Foulks v. Lehman, 17 S.W.2d 994 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929); Wendel v. City
Ice Co., supra note 36; Duncan v. City Ice Co., supra note 67; Hatton v. Sidman,
supra note 65; Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 65; McCaffery v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 65; Bullock v. Sklar, supra note 68.
71. Plannett v. McFall, supra note 22.
72. Wendel v. City Ice Co., supra note 36.
73. Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 65; Haley v. Edwards,
supra note 65; Bullock v. Sklar, supra note 68.
74. Bullock v. Sklar, supra note 68.
75. Ibid.
15
Vetter: Vetter: Voir Dire II--Liability Insurance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
whether they are connected with76 the company. And it has been held proper
to inquire if the jurors are acquainted with any officers7 7 employees,7M
agents,70 claims adjusters, 0 attorneys in fact,8' or anybody connected with 2
the company.
In those situations where defense counsel has attempted to keep
out any reference to a specific company by refusing to name the company
or evading the question as to the company's interest or disclaiming knowl-
edge of facts indicating the company's interest, evidence by plaintiff's
counsel as to the interest of the company has been sufficient to allow
inquiry as to the specific company.83
If so many possible connections are valid subjects of inquiry it would
logically follow that a series of questions as to each of these relationships
would also be valid. Thus in Jones v. Missouri Freight Transit Corp. 4
plaintiff asked the jurors:
If any of them were acquainted with Sam E. Busler & Company
insurance dealers, . . .with H. P. Howard a salesman for that
company and N. E. LaTish whose office is in the same suite with
the Busler Company; if they have any relatives or close friends
employed by that organization; if they have ever had any busi-
ness dealings with that organization, or any of their close friends
ever had any business dealings with that organization. If they
ever had any business dealings with the Western Insurance Com-
panies; if they had any policies in any of these companies, have
had any business dealings with any of the companies, or have any
relatives or close friends employed by any of the companies."5
The court "fail[ed] to see . . . any evidence from which might be in-
ferred a lack of good faith . .."86
76. Duncan v. City Ice Co., supra note 67.
77. Plannett v. McFall, supra note 22.
78. Hatton v. Sidman, supra note 65; Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
.rupra note 65.
79. Plannett v. McFall, supra note 22.
80. Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., supra note 46.
81. Ibid; Wendel v. City Ice Co., supra note 36.
82. Foulks v. Lehman, supra note 70; Hatton v. Sidman, supra note 65.
83. Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., supra note 46; Glick v. Arink, supra note 46;
Melican v. Whitlow Const. Co. supra note 47; Gerran v. Minor, supra note 47; Gal-
ber v. Grossberg, supra note 10.
84. 225 Mo. App. 1076, 40 S.W.2d 465 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
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B. Any Insurance Company
Where plaintiff knows that the defendant is insured but has been
thwarted in his attempts to determine the name of the company it is
possible to question the jurors concerning their relationships with any
insurance company. Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co. 7 indicated that if defense
counsel admits that an insurance company is interested but refuses to
name the company in response to a request by plaintiff's counsel then a
question as to the jurors' relationships with any company would be
proper. A similar result was reached in Hannah v. Butts." Counsel for
defendant admitted that a policy had been issued but stated that he did
not know the name of the company involved. The court authorized the
plaintiff to inquire as to any insurance company.8 9
But in Pilkerton v. Miller?0 it was held reversible error to allow
plaintiff to question the jurors concerning their connection with any in-
surance company that writes liability insurance to protect automobile
operators when the record disclosed no reason for believing that any man
on the jury panel had such a connection. The basis for the decision does
not seem sound. If the court had based its decision on the fact that there
was no indication that any insurance company was even interested in
the case the holding would be on stronger ground. Clearly, to allow a ques-
tion such as was asked based on a simple assumption that the defendant was
insured would be most prejudicial to the uninsured defendant and would
violate the first part of the Maurizi test, that is, "reasonable cause for
belief that an insurance company is interested in the case."91
VI. THE UNDERINSURED DEFENDANT AND THE NON-INSURED Co-DEFENDANT
So far this article has been concerned only with the basic situation
where the plaintiff and the interested insurance company are the sole
parties concerned with the effect of the voir dire on the jurors. The plain-
tiff hopes that the existence of liability insurance will be sufficient to give
him the verdict on a close factual situation or to increase the amount of
damages awarded him. The insurance company would like to keep its
interest concealed for exactly opposite reasons. The Missouri decisions
clearly assist the plaintiff's cause.
87. Supra note 11.
88. Supra note 2.
89. See also Smith v. Scudiero, supra note 46 (defendant refused to answer
whether he was representing an insurance company).
90. 283 S.W. 455 (Spr. Mo. App. 1926).
91. Supra note 25, at 396, 11 S.W.2d at 274.
1964]
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If the cases were confined to this plaintiff-insurer conflict of interest
it might be argued that any possibly prejudicial burden placed on the
insurer which results in a judgment adverse to it merely reflects the basic
notion of the public that the loss should be borne by the insurer who will
be able to spread the loss among thousands of policy holders. From such
a standpoint disclosure of liability insurance through voir dire might be
viewed as a cost of doing business as an insurer. But there are two situ-
ations where the jury's verdict, or its measure of damages, if influenced
to any degree by the presence of a liability insurer brings about a com-
pletely inequitable result. These involve the problems of the underinsured
defendant and the uninsured joint tortfeasor.
A. The Underinsured Defendant
The fact that the plaintiff claims damages in excess of the amount
of the defendant's coverage is no bar to the right of plaintiff to question
the jurors as to their relationships with the insurer.92 The underinsured
defendant is thus confronted with the situation where, as a result of
voir dire, the jury realizes the existence of his coverage but not its extent.
And if the jury awards an excessive verdict the individual defendant must
carry the burden.
A possible solution may be found in the case of Rytersky v. O'Brine.9 3
Plaintiff's attorney had inquired fully as to the jurors' relationships with
the defendant's insurer. Counsel for defendant on his voir dire questioned
the jury as follows:
There has been some reference to the Commonwealth Casualty
and Insurance Company. I want to be absolutely frank with you
gentlemen about that feature of the case. To a limited extent, I
represent the Commonwealth Casualty Company. That is, Mr.
O'Brine had an insurance policy in the Commonwealth Casualty
Company to a certain limit, providing that this Company would
indemnify him against loss sustained by reason of his negligence
in the operation of his automobile. Of course, if there is no negli-
gence on his part, then, of course there is no liability on the part
of the insurance company. In other words the rule of law is not
changed just because there is an insurance company interested to a
limited extent. Now, would the fact that he does carry insurance
to a limited degree, as I have indicated, cause you gentlemen to
have any feeling of prejudice in favor of the plaintiff?"4
92. Jones v. Missouri Freight Transit Corp., supra note 84.
93. 335 Mo. 22, 70 S.W.2d 538 (1934).
94. Id. at 25-26, 70 S.W.2d at 539.
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While no objection was made at the time of the statement and ques-
tion, counsel for plaintiff 'used this as an excuse to inject insurance into
the closing argument. In commenting on defendant's voir dire the court
found nothing improper and that any objection to it "would have been
properly overruled." The court observed that the defendant was entitled
to determine if any juror would be influenced or prejudiced in favor of
plaintiff because of the existence of an insurance policy. As to the critical
element of the question-the "limited extent" of the insurance-the court
said: "Whether the policy was large or small was wholly immaterial.
Defendant's attorney mentioned the policy as being limited in amount
but how could that harm plaintiff?"95
If the only purpose of voir dire questioning concerning relationships
with an insurance company is to obtain an impartial, disinterested jury
then it seems clear that the side of the policy is, indeed, "wholly imma-
terial," and to describe it as being "limited" theoretically should not
harm the plaintiff. Counsel for an underinsured defendant may find that
a course similar to that set out in Rytersky will be the only possible way
to minimize the effect of the disclosure of insurance coverage.
B. The Uninsured Joint Tortfeasor
A second difficult situation is that involving joint tortfeasors where
only one is insured. The earliest case passing on this problem is Malone v.
Small.9 Malone was a passenger in an automobile owned by Clymer and
driven by Clymer's wife which collided with the automobile of Small.
Plaintiff brought action against both the Clymers and Small.
Prior to voir dire counsel for plaintiff was informed that the Clymers
were insured and the insurer was defending them. He then indicated his
intent to question the jurors as to their relationships with the insurer.
Counsel for defendant Small argued that the question should not apply
to his client as he was uninsured and in no way connected with the
company involved. He requested that if the question was asked then he
should be allowed to inform the jury as to his position. Counsel for the
Clymers objected to this request on the basis that such a statement
would be prejudicial to his clients. The objection was sustained and Small
excepted. Plaintiff proceeded to question the jurors. He recovered a
judgment for $5,000 and all the defendants appealed. On appeal the court
observed that the purpose of voir dire by the plaintiff was to enable
95. Id. at 30, 70 S.W.2d at 541.
96. 291 S.W. 163 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
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him to secure a fair and impartial jury and that under these circum-
stances "there was no harm done, theoretically at least, to defendant
Small."r
This rule was approved by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Star Cab
Co., "Plaintiff cannot be denied the right .to qualify the members of
the panel for this reason; and if a defendant without insurance is prej-
udiced thereby he is without remedy."' 91
VII. SUMMATION
Under the present state of the Missouri law the proper procedure for
plaintiff to follow is first to inquire if defendant is represented by a li-
ability insurer. If he is given an affirmative answer including the name
of the insurance company, he may proceed to inquire as to the jurors'
relationships with that company.99 If defendant gives an affirmative answer
but refuses to name the company, plaintiff's independent knowledge as
to the identity of the company will be sufficient to permit an identical
line of questioning. If defendant gives an affirmative answer but refuses
to name the company and the plaintiff has been unable to determine the
identity of the company, then he may inquire as to the jurors' connections
with any insurance company. 100
If defendant refuses to answer or evades the question or disclaims
knowledge of the facts, then an assumption will be made that an insurance
company is interested.10'
If defendant denies that an insurance company is interested, then
plaintiff should be prepared to prove that he has reasonable cause for belief
of such an interest. 10
Finally, if plaintiff has not made a prior inquiry of defendant, then
he should, at the minimum, inform the court as to his belief of the in-
surer's interest.1o03
The plaintiff who has reasonable cause for belief that an insurance
company is interested in the case has an impressive list of legitimate
97. Id. at 165.
98. Supra note 10, at 446, 19 S.W.2d at 469. In accord see Joyce v. Biring, 226
Mo. App. 162, 43 S.W.2d 845 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931); Clayton v. Wells, 324 Mo.
1176, 26 S.W.2d 969 (1930); Clayton v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 27 S.W.2d 52(St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
99. Text at note 17 supra.
100. Text at note 87 supra.
101. Text at note 46 supra.
102. Carter v. Rock Island Bus Lines, supra note 40.
103. Henry v. Tinsley, supra note 31.
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questions which he may address to the jurors. While the appellate courts
have occasionally expressed the opinion that "the better practice is to
ascertain whether any panel member is interested by asking one general
question,"'- it is apparent that counsel rarely follow "the better practice"
preferring instead a line of multiple questioning with its inherent emphasis
on the existence of liability insurance.
The main obstacle to plaintiff's approach is the latitude given to the
trial court under the Carter decision in determining the good faith nature
of the inquiry. Thus, where trial judges have expressed their opinions as
to what constitutes good faith conduct, the questioning should be con-
fined to the indicated limits. Only a palpable abuse of their discretion will
merit a reversal.105
As for defendants, their bitter complaints 06 will fall on deaf appellate
ears.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ultimate purpose of voir dire is to enable the parties to obtain
a fair and impartial jury. But a juror's partiality toward the ordinary
defendant cannot be said to exist merely because the jurors may have
some connection with an insurance company. The element of prejudice
only comes into existence when the juror has some such connection and
he believes or knows that the insurer with which he is connected has
insured the defendant. It would seem wholly unreasonable to suppose that
a juror will allow his judgment to be influenced by conjecture that a) an
insurance company is involved and b) that company is the very one in
which he has an interest. If a juror, on voir dire, is shown to be unac-
quainted with the parties of record or their counsel and further, to be
totally unfamiliar with the subject matter of the cause before him, then
he cannot be said to be prejudiced if he is unaware of the interest of
an unknown insurance company.
It is unfortunate that the liberal attitude of the Missouri courts in
this area has probably led to a situation where, contrary to its time-
honored purpose, voir dire results in establishing partiality in the minds
of the jurors rather than exposing it.
The recent case of Goocl. v. Avsco, InC.10 7 clearly indicates the situa-
104. Bunch v. Crader, 369 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
105. Supra note 45.
106. Bunch v. Crader, supra note 104.
107. 340 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1960).
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tion created by this attitude. Plaintiff asked three questions concerning
the subject of stockholding, employment, and policy holding with the
defendant's insurer. There followed several other questions on other topics.
Then counsel asked, "Is there any member of the jury panel or any of
your immediate family that is a claim adjuster or handles claims or
investigations for any insurance comp anies? "I-0 (Emphasis added). De-
fendant objected and moved to discharge the jury. The trial court refused
and the defendant excepted. On appeal the Supreme Court held:
While it was undoubtedly proper on voir dire to determine whether
any member of the panel was employed as a claims investigator or
adjuster, it perhaps would have been desirable to have inquired
generally rather than to have limited the question to insurance
company adjusters. It seems apparent, however, that the adjuster
question as asked could not have injected the matter of insurance
any more surely into the case than had been done by three prior
questions which defendants concede were proper and to which no
objection was made.109
But, of course, if the questions were proper then no objections should
have been made. They would have been promptly overruled and would
have only served further to point out to the jury the relationship between
the defendant and the insurance company.
Any procedure which may unnecessarily implant the seeds of prejudice
in the minds of the jurors should from time to time be carefully scrutinized
to determine whether the point has been reached where the treatment
is worse than the disease. Perhaps voir dire has reached this point, at
least where the question of liability insurance is involved. If so, the time
may be at hand when the search for some alternative solution should
begin. The potential framework for such a solution may be found in
section 498.130 of the Missouri Revised Statutes which provides that the
jury commissioner of the City of St. Louis may "require any person
to answer, under oath ... all such questions as he [the commissioner]
may address to such person, touching his name, age, residence, occupation,
and qualifications as a juror. . . ." Under the authority of this provision
of the statute it would seem that a procedure could be developed whereby
the commissioner could be given the names of the specific insurance
companies interested in causes on the docket and strike from the jury
108. Id. at 667.
109. Id. at 667-68.
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lists any individuals who are connected with those companies so as to
eliminate any necessity for counsel to inquire on voir dire on the topic
of insurance.
If a procedure of this nature could be adopted, and if it were given
state-wide application, then voir dire might once again have as its sole
purpose the securing of a fair and impartial jury.
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